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NOTES
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CASES
The constitutionality of compulsory accident compensation laws
has been upheld in two decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court.' In
New York Central Railroad Co. v. White,2 the court upheld a law
requiring employers to pay compensation to employees in enumerated
hazardous occupations for injuries by accident arising out of and in
course of employment, regardless of fault, and requiring them to
insure payment of same. In Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,3
the court went a step further and pronounced valid a law requiring
employers to pay into a state fund such sums for insurance as should
be assessed by the insurance department upon their class or occupa-
tion. The court draws the distinction that while the New York law
says, "Pay your employees when they are injured and insure such
payment," the Washington law says, "Whether your employees are
injured or not, pay insurance into our state fund and we will pay
compensation in case of injury." Although the effect of the laws is
the same, the burden is more direct under the New York law.
The New York case settles once for all, the proposition, ques-
tioned by the Ives decision 4 that liability without fault is constitu-
tional. The argument is the well accepted one, that no one has a
vested interest in the rules of the common law, and that liability with-
out fault is not new to that law. The court cites the rule of respon-
dant superior, the liability of innkeepers, and the rule as to dangerous
things as common law examples of liability without fault, and also
its own decisions in Mondou v. Ry.5 and C., B. Q. v. McGuire 6 on
limitation of freedom of contract.
The Washington case considers whether the requirement of pay-
ments under the law constitutes a taking in excess of the police power,
and interprets that power in the most liberal terms. It holds that the
taking of private property is justified in this case "by the public nature
of the object." "Special burdens are often necessary for general bene-
fits," says the court. "The idea of special excise taxes for regula-
For discussion of this question, see 2 St. Louis Law Rev. 29.
237 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297.
337 Sup. Ct. Rep. 260.
4 Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. 201 N. Y. 271.
223 U. S. 1, 52.
'219 U. S. 549, 571.
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tion and revenue proportioned to the special injury attributable to the
activities of the taxed is not novel." 7
Besides upholding these beneficial laws, the cases make history
in the law of master and servant, and add a new chapter to the liberal
interpretation of the police power. In the New York case, the court
labels the fellow-servant rule and assumption of risk as "the product
of a judicial conception," and argues the validity of the present law
fairly on the facts, after the most approved method of "sociological
jurisprudence." "In excluding the question of fault as a cause of
injury, the act in effect disregards the proximate cause and looks to
one more remote-the primary cause, as it may be deemed-and that
is the employment itself." The loss by injury is "a loss arising out of
the business, and, however, it may be charged up, is an expense of
the operation, as truly as the cost of repairing broken machinery, or
any other expense that ordinarily is paid by the employer."
The greatest significance of the cases is the recognition of the
public nature of all employments. "Certainly the operation of indus-
trial establishments that, in the ordinary course of things, frequently
and inevitably produce disabling or mortal injuries to the human
beings employed, is not a matter of wholly private concern. . . . A
familiar exercise of state power is the grant of pensions to disabled
soldiers and to the widows and dependents of those killed in war....
But is the state powerless to compensate with pensions or otherwise,
those who are disabled, or the dependents of those whose lives are
lost, in the industrial occupations that are so necessary to develop the
resources and add to the wealth and prosperity of the nation ?" The
court therefore concludes that the state "may regulate the carrying
on of industrial occupations that frequently and inevitably produce
personal injuries and disability. . . . and require that these human
losses shall be charged against the industry either directly as is done
in the case of the New York act.... or by publicly administering the
compensation and distributing the cost among the industries affected
by a reasonable system of occupation taxes." R. W. C.
The Court here cites Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104; Hen-
drick v. Md. 235, U. S. 610; Kane v. N. J. 242 U. S. 160; Morey v. Brown, 42
N. H. 373.
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